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Tactical Air Power
in Normandy
Some Thoughts on the Interdiction Plan.
Robert Vogel

T

he Allied campaign in North-West Europe
in 1944-45 ended with the capitulation
of the German Army and must, therefore, be
considered an eminently successful operation.
In its initial phase, that is the assault on
Normandy and the securing of a defensible
lodgement area, it was undoubtedly one of
the most dangerous and complicated
operations of the war. Nevertheless it ended
as the victory which marked the beginning of
the end of the Third Reich. Like many other
campaigns, however, it did not go exactly as
planned and many have claimed that the
Allied Armies were neither properly trained
nor adequately led and that, therefore, some
other element ensured the victory. The
overwhelming power of the Allied air force
and its effects on the operations ofthe German
Army has been the favourite theme of both
historians 1 and the German generals. 2 This
powerful combination has long dominated
the assessment ofthe campaign. It is not the
purpose of this essay to minimize the
importance of Allied air operations, in
particular the attacks on the German
communication system. Rather, it is an
attempt to examine in some detail the actual
results of that operation in order to obtain a
clearer understanding of its place among the
many other ingredients which combined to
defeat the German Army in Normandy.
The prerequisites for an Allied victory
were simple in theory but difficult in execution.
"In war," Hindenburg said "only the simple
succeeds." These simple things included the
need to breach the Atlantic Wall quickly, the
establishment of a lodgment area secure
enough to ensure the safe arrival of essential
supplies and a reinforcement rate which would

more than match the German ability to bring
troops to Normandy. In the event all three
prerequisites were fulfilled, but the reasons
for this success have caused considerable
debate. Which of the many Allied stratagems
to ensure victory had been the most
successful, quite apart, of course, from the
actual fighting on the ground? Was it the
deception plan with regard to a possible
second landing in the Pas de Calais area, the
actions of the French Resistance, the
information provided by Ultra or Allied air
superiority? Or perhaps it was those factors
over which the Western Allies had no control
such as the timing of the Russian Summer
Offensive [June 22nd] and the collapse of
army Group Centre, the quarrel between
Rundstedt and Rommel over the disposition
of the German Armour, the failure of OKW to
release the German reserve
the list is long
and each has had some earnest advocates.
But most have argued that the chief
ingredient for Allied success was the actions
of the Allied air forces, particularly the tactical
support offered to the Allied armies. In order
to understand the role played by the tactical
use of air power, the objectives of Allied air
power must be classified into a variety of
specific aims, some of which had to be
completed before D-Day. The first, and the
one regarded as absolutely essential for all
operations connected with Neptune, was the
winning of air superiority over the battlefield.
This task proved easier than expected and
there can be no doubt that throughout the
campaign the Luftwaffe played a very minor
role despite the attractive targets offered by
the concentration of Allied shipping. It should
be remembered, however, that the winning of
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Destruction wrought by the Allied Air Forces at a rail yard in France.

(CFPU PL 32257)

air superiority was really accomplished in the
long and costly fight waged by Bomber
Command and the U.S. Eighth Air Force
during the winter of 1943-4, so that by the
spring of 1944, the German fighter forces
were virtually helpless in the face of
overwhelming Allied air power. Nevertheless,
the Allied air forces devoted considerable
effort to attacking German airfields and
Luftwaffe installations generally in the period
before and during the invasion. The high
price which was paid by the Allied air forces
during the operations in the spring were
exacted largely by the effectiveness of the
German anti-aircraft defenses.

The second objective was the disruption
ofthe French railway network so that German
supplies and reinforcements would not be
able to take advantage of this efficient
transportation system. This operation, over
which there was a great deal of Allied
controversy, was carried out largely by heavy
bombers and there is still considerable debate
about whether the plan was altogether
successful. 3
The third task was the almost
continuous attack on German coastal
batteries and defense positions along the
coastline, an aspect of the pre-Neptune
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A reconnaissance flight over the Normandy beaches on 6 May 1944 catches German troops scrambling for cover.
Detailed information on the beach defences was obtained.from "dicing" shots like this one. Timber ramps, with
mines or saw-toothed blades to take out the bottoms of landing craft, are clearly visible.
(U.S. Air Force Photo 57357 A. C.)

operations which has received relatively little
attention from the historians. 4 Targets in
this group included the major radar stations,
a particularly important element of the
German defenses because the Luftwaffe had
lost most of its reconnaissance capability.
The radar installations were especially difficult
targets because they were among the most
heavily defended.
The bombardment
increased in intensity until finally on the
night of June 5-6th, the Allied air forces were
used to saturate the German defenses and
radar installations on and immediately beyond
the proposed landing sites.

Fourthly, the Allied air forces carried
out a continuous reconnaissance over the
whole of Western Europe, particularly over
the areas of the German Seventh and Fifteenth
Armies. Nor does that complete the activities
of the Allied air forces. Coastal Command
carried out mine-laying and harassment
operations which effectively neutralized the
remnants of the German Naval forces on the
west coast of France and Belgium. This
effort, on the part of one of the smaller Allied
commands, involved more than 5,000 sorties
in the period of April-May 1944.
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It must be added that the Allied air
forces also carried out a number of other
operations, some of which, like the attacks on
the German V1 and V2 installations, were
regarded as being of almost equal importance
to the operations in preparation forD-Day.
The attack on this group of targets, known as
Operation "Crossbow," was designed to
prevent the German V -weapons from
becoming a serious danger in the summer of
1944. As well as carrying on this complicated
series of operations, Bomber Command, as
well as the U.S. Eighth and Fifteenth Air
Forces continued to bomb Germany, making
substantial raids on a variety of targets.

The air commanders had always
emphasized the flexibility of their forces and
certainly in this period this was well illustrated
by the fact that the Allied air forces were
obedient to so many different directives and
target selection systems. Statistics are useful
only in the sense that they provide some
concept of the enormous scope of these
operations and the high casualties which the
Allied air forces sustained. More than 200,000
sorties were flown in this preparatory period
and about 200,000 tons ofbombs dropped on
targets in France and Germany. The cost was
high, about 2,000 Allied aircraft were shot
down resulting in the loss of more than 12,000
men.
Once the Allies were ashore, the task of
the tactical air forces was the maintenance of
air superiority, the continuation of the attempt
to isolate the battlefield and the use of aircraft
to strike at tactical targets as required by the
Army. Again there is little dispute about the
fact that the Allied air forces were largely
successful in keeping the Luftwaffe away
from the battlefield - "If it's white, it's
American, if it's black, it's British, if you can't
see it, it's the Luftwaffe" is how the German
soldiers described the situation. The more
difficult questions relate to the extent to
which air power managed to "isolate" the
battlefield and how far the air forces managed
to provide effective tactical support for the
armies. This essay will attempt only to address
the first of these problems.

The controversy which surrounds the
whole question of attacking the French railway
system is well known and needs little retelling. The problems were manifold. There
was first of all the question of whether the
transportation network in France was so dense
that the bombing could not really prevent it
from supplying the basic needs ofthe German
Army. 5 There were secondly the hesitations
of Churchill with respect to the number of
French civilian casualties which the bombing
was bound to entail. There was also the fear
that the bombing pattern would reveal the
intended Allied landing site and that therefore
the attempt to isolate the battlefield should
wait until the day of the actual landing. The
other side ofthat particular argument against
the interdiction plan was of course that to
wait until the last day would mean that
everything would depend on the weather; bad
weather during the first week of the invasion
would make it virtually impossible to carry
out the necessary air strikes. And indeed the
weather during the second and third days of
the invasion severely inhibited the operations
of the air forces. The whole controversy was
not resolved until April 14th when Eisenhower
was finally given the "direction of the strategic
air forces in support of Overlord." From that
date onwards the plan to "interdict" the French
transportation network on a massive scale
began. The main objective was to inflict
sufficient damage to that network so that the
Germans would not be able to reinforce their
troops in Normandy more quickly than the
Allies could reinforce theirs.
The major difficulty in assessing the
success of the "interdiction" operation lies in
the complicated nature of the German
response to the landings in Normandy. The
German Command reacted with great caution,
believing that the Allies were capable of
undertaking at least one other major assault
on the coast of northern France, most
particularly, in the area of the Pas de Calais.
Therefore the plan, known as "Case 3", for
immediately reinforcing the Seventh Army
with a second Army Command, 5 corps and
10 divisions [six of which would have come
from the Fifteenth Army's Reserve] was
apparently never even considered. 6
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The immediate response to the Allied
landings was to provide support from within
Seventh Army. The II Parachute Corps, with
77th, 265th, 275th 7 and 3rd Parachute
Divisions were dispatched to the western side
of the landings. The 346th Infantry Division
from Fifteenth Army reserve, the only unit to
be transferred from Fifteenth Army, was sent
to the extreme eastern side of the landing
area. The armoured divisions - 12th SS
Panzer, 2nd Panzer and Panzer Lehr - with
their appropriate Corps as well as the
Headquarters of Panzer Group West and the
LXXXI Army Corps and the III Flak Corps
were made available and the 17th SS Panzer
Grenadier Division was released from south
of the Loire. 8 At the same time, however,
Fifteenth Army received two divisions, one
from Norway, the 89th and one from Denmark,
the 363rd, as well as having two new ones
created in its area, the 6th Parachute and

Right: A gun camera photo ofa German convoy being
strafed by a P-47 Thunderbolt from the Ninth
U.S. Air Force.
(U.S. Army Photo)
Below: A group ofCanadian officers watching Hawker
Typhoons of 121 Squadron, RAF taking off
(NAC PA 116725)
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l36th Infantry. It also lost the 19th Panzer
Division to Army Group Centre in Russia and
the 19th Luftwaffe Field Division to Army
Group C in Italy. This was a considerable
amount of seemingly unnecessary movement
on a devastated railway system.
The question remains how far the
tactical air forces interfered with all these
movements and how far the battlefield can be
considered to have been "isolated." The
experiences of the arriving troops with regard
to delays because of the unavailability of rail
transport and attacks from the tactical air
force vary greatly. The infantry that arrived
from Brittany which was, in any case, not
mechanically mobile, except for bicycles,
managed to arrive on the battlefront within
two or three days. The l 7th SS Panzer
Grenadier Division, although strung out on
the roads, was ready to be committed on the
8th but changing orders from Rommel seemed
to have delayed its actual commitment and as
a result, it arrived at the front in scattered
units. Units of the lst U.S. Infantry Division
were in contact with the l 7th SS as early as
the lOth June.
The armour which was released on the
first day- 12th SS and Panzer Lehr - came
by road and suffered, by their accounts,
relatively few casualties on the march. 9 The
vanguard of the SS Division was held up
largely because when it was ordered west of
Caen, the roads through the city were
considered unsuitable and it had to make its
way around the city. Nevertheless during the
following day, the 25th Panzer Regiment,
supported by some tanks, launched a series
of attacks on the advanced regiments of the
3rd Canadian Infantry Division. The second
Panzer Grenadier Regiment, the 26th, was in
action the following day. 10
The III Flak Corps moved up, largely by
road and was ready to participate in the
counterattack of the ISS Panzer Corps on the
llth. Its commander, Pickert, claimed that
the movement was carried out with no
casualties or damage. 11

move on the morning of the 7th (or late on the
6th). Its advanced units were in the line on
the morning of the 8th, but the armour and
much of its other equipment would not close
up for another 24 hours. Still it reported few
losses in transit although there were delays
and arguments about whether it should move
during daylight hours, which in fact it did. 12
The 2nd Panzer Division had much
further to go; its headquarters was at
Abbeville, although the Division was strung
out along the valley of the Somme. It was
ordered to the Front on the 9th June and
made its way via Paris. Some of its motorized
units were south ofCaumont on the 12th but
its tanks were strung out as far back as Paris.
The Division was fully engaged by the 18th.
Luttwitz, its Commander, complained about
delays and inadequate transport but does not
report any actual damage or loss. 13
The l 0 l Heavy Tank Battalion of the I
SS Panzer Corps moved by road from Beauvais
about 70 kilometres north-west of Paris during
the night of 6-7th June. Its third company
and its Repair and Recovery Unit were badly
damaged by an air attack in a wood near
Versailles on the following night but the lst
and 2nd Companies were fighting near VillersBocage on June 13th, as the British 7th
Armoured Division discovered to its regret. 14
The experiences of the various divisions
ordered to the front, therefore, appear to have
varied greatly and this situation does not
seem to have changed in the second half of
June or July. The 276th Infantry Division,
for instance, was ordered from the south of
France on June 15th and was in the line five
days later. Badinsky, its commander, reported
no difficulties in transit. 15 On the other hand,
the l st SS Panzer Division ordered from
Zwanestrand, northeast of Antwerp on June
17th, did not have its infantry in place until
the 28th and its tanks until a week later.
Nevertheless its commander, Wisch, claimed
that it had sustained no damage during
transit. 16 Like the 2nd SS Panzer Division it
carried out anti-guerrilla operations in a
seemingly unhurried move to the frontY

The Panzer Lehr Division, stationed
about 113 kilometres from the front, began to
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These photos
show the
effect of
Allied air
power on
German
transport
during the
closing of the
Falaise Gap.
Photos taken
on 20Augusi
1944.

(U.S. Air
Force
Photos A &
B-54338
A. C.)
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The II SS Panzer Corps crossed all of
Europe from Lemerg to Normandy between
June 11th and 28th, although some of its
advance units, such as its Heavy Tank
Battalion, 102, were already at the front on
the 22nd. Despite the fact that Ultra had
pinpointed the whereabouts of the large
number of trains required for the move of the
two armoured divisions and their general
unloading areas, it seems that most of the
men and material arrived safely in
Normandy. 18 The same appears to have been
true for the various other divisions which
were moving across France at the same time
(353rd, 266th, 16th GAF and 6th Parachute);
even the crossing ofthe Seine appears to have
been manageable. The 346th Infantry Division
crossed on 8-9 June to reinforce the extreme
left wing of the 7th Army. 19 When the reserves
of the Fifteenth Army were finally released in
the middle of July, some of the units crossed
the Seine southwards.
Clearly no one can say how much faster
German troops would have arrived without
the transportation plan and the continuing
harassment from the air. It is fairly clear,
however, that the failure to provide rapid
reinforcement to Normandy was caused by
many factors of which air power was only one.
The most important "other" factor was surely
the hesitation with which the German
Command handled the situation. It was not
prepared to give ground in Normandy, not
even to make the most elementary adjustment
in its line to get the German troops out of
range of the Allied naval guns, which time
and again interfered with German
concentrations or made pin-point strikes
against German positions. Moreover the
continuing belief, as much self-delusion as
Allied deception, that a second landing in
northern France was imminent, forced the
German Command to bring troops from as far
away as Norway and southern France and
leave the strong Fifteenth Army virtually
intact.
It has also been argued that the effect of
air power on the movement of supplies, was of
major importance, but in the field of logistics
there are still more factors to be considered.
On a "normal" battle day in June, Seventh

Army, which controlled the supply system for
all units at the front, including Panzer Group
West, said it needed 3200 tonnes of transport
space, roughly divided into 500 tonnes for
supply, 1200 for ammunition and 1500 cbm.
for POL [petrol, oil and lubricants]; if an
attack was to be launched both ammunition
and POL needed to increase to 1500 tonnes
and 2500 cbm. respectively. During this
period, however, Seventh Army claimed that
it rarely had more than 1300 tonnes of total
transport capacity available with the result
that ammunition and fuel were usually in
short supply on the German side. 20 The
Allies, on the other hand, while they did
suffer occasional shortages, were able with
their air forces and navies to protect their
supply system so well that only the storm of
June 18-19th really placed them in an
unusually difficult position. The question
remains whether this chronic shortage on the
German side was caused by the actions of the
Allied air forces or by the lack of German
motor transport and the general shortages of
fuel which were beginning to be felt everywhere
within German control. Clearly, the actions
of the tactical air forces did not ease the
German supply problems but, conversely,
these problems did not prevent the German
Army from fighting a long and bitter campaign
in Normandy. 21
Can any clear conclusion be reached in
this situation? The battle of Normandy was
full of anomalies and neither Montgomery
nor Rommel shone in this campaign. Each
appears to have tried the tactics which had
made the other famous - Montgomery
attempting to break through the German
defenses with narrow spearheads of tanks,
which brought high cost failures in June and
July while Rommel conducted a campaign of
static attrition, perhaps perforce, using his
tanks in order to hold the line, while much of
the Army Group B infantry sat north of the
Seine. This situation, over which the two
commanders perhaps had less control than
they might have wished, brought high
casualties to the ground forces. In fact in
early July both commands were in despair;
the Allies because of the slowness of their
advance and the unexpectedly high infantry
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Mitchell medium bombers from 2 Group, Second Tactical Air Force on a mission over France prior to D-Day.

(NAC PA 115106)

casualties, and the Germans because they
recognized that the line in Normandy was
extremely fragile and that once it had broken
all of France and Belgium would have to be
abandoned.
The Allied response to the stalemate
that seemed to be developing in the first
weeks of July was to make even greater
demands on the Allied air forces. The Germans
could not draw on the same degree of support
from the Luftwaffe. The use of the heavy
bombers at Caen, "Goodwood" and "Cobra,"
opens a whole new series of questions about
the efficacy ofthese machines in close support
roles. Here it needs only to be said that again
there is a good deal of controversy about
whether they made the break-out possible or
not. That they helped cannot be seriously
questioned. Every German vehicle destroyed,
every position made harmless, was surely a
bonus to the advancing infantry and tanks.
Nevertheless the ground had to be won and it
was won the hard way by the ground forces.
There were no "magic" solutions.

What may be even more difficult to
assess than the material damage done by air
power was the effect on the morale of the
German Army. The evidence on how individual
units or soldiers reacted tends to be anecdotal
and in some respects unreliable. It made
relatively little difference to the advancing
Allied troops if German machine-gunners were
unhappy while firing their weapons. It was
only when whole units broke as a result of air
attacks that one could argue that bombing
had destroyed the morale of the German
forces and that happened too rarely to be
taken as a serious factor in the Allied victory.
The effect on the German commanders may
well be a different matter. Nearly all of them
emphasize the importance of the
overwhelming weight of the air forces in
bringing victory to the Allies in Normandy.
Such an assessment may very well be true
but it must also be remembered that the air
forces were one of the elements over which
the German generals had no control, so that
they could well argue that the loss of the
battle was not their fault but rather that of
45
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the Luftwaffe; they also knew that many of
the Allied interrogators shared this view and
naturally gave at least some of the answers
which seemed to be expected. On the other
hand, there can surely be no doubt that they
felt terribly helpless in the face of the complete
Allied control of the sky. This was a situation
which only rarely existed on the Russian
front even in 1944 and certainly the German
Army had won its more spectacular campaigns
in the early part of the war at a time when it
was the Luftwaffe which had dominated the
skies.
Perhaps the only answer to the question
raised here is that one cannot attribute the
victory to any specific branch of the Allied
services. The Allies hoped for a quick victory
and, despite their experience in Italy, they
believed that it was possible to win such a
victory with the minimum of infantry
casualties because of what tanks and aircraft
were supposed to accomplish. They became
extremely worried in June and July when
infantry casualties mounted alarmingly
without any large territorial gains: it looked
briefly as if a major battle of attrition would
develop in Normandy, similar to those fought
in the 1914-1918 war. That could be
construed as showing the failure of the
interdiction plan, just as the final break-out
could be attributed to its success. Both
assertions are really exaggerations. The
interdiction plan was of considerable
importance and helped the Allied cause. It
did not fully succeed in blocking either
German reinforcements or German supplies
but it helped to slow them down. It deprived
the enemy of much flexibility and initiative.
In other words it was a necessary but not a
sufficient condition for the victory. In the
final analysis the Allies still had to fight on
the ground and learn how to beat a stubborn
and sometimes skilful enemy who remained
in the field despite everything that the air
forces accomplished.

NOTES
1. "Allied air power was so overwhelming that the defeat of
Allied intentions on the ground never threatened disaster. only delay, and that only in the early stages, well
compensated later. But let us be quite clear about it:

what made ultimate victory possible was crushing air
power. It is not pleasant to contemplate what might
have happened without it." John Terraine, The Right of
the Line (London, 1985). p.619. Chester Wilmot, The
Struggle for Europe had made roughly the same point in
his 1952 account - p.289.
2. For example see the Department ofthe Army: Historical
Section: O.B. West: "Atlantic Wall to Siegfried Line -A
Study in Command" 5 vols. Written by a large number
of the German generals who held command positions
during this period. See particularly Vol.1 Ch.1 - "The
Decisive Influence of Enemy Air Power": This particular
set can be found in the National Archives of Canada
[NAC]. The complete "B" series, 850 separate narratives
[some very long] written between 1946 and 1948 by the
German officers, are in OCMH, Washington.
3. See, for example, Sir John Kennedy, The Business of
War, (London, 1957). "As it tumed out, it would not
have mattered if we had not dropped a single bomb
before Overlord with the object of checking German
military movement." p.325
4. Details of the effect of bombing of individual installations may be found in weekly reports of Army Group
"B", "Fliegerangriffe und ihre Auswirkungen im Bereich
W.B. NiederlandeundA.O.K. 15, Mai,Juni,Juli 1944."
See Microfilm Records of Germany Army: T 311/3. I am
grateful to my Research Assistant, Mr. Ralph Guentzel,
who carefully listed virtually every incident as described in the above named document, as well as
examining many other microfilm reels in connection
with a larger project on the effects of Allied bombing
policy prior to and during the Overlord operation.
5. The question of whether bombing could seriously disrupt such a dense railway network as the French one
was the subject of intense debate in which the reluctance of the Strategic Air Forces to divert their heavy
bombers from the offensive against German industry
played a significant role. The literature on this subject
is virtually limitless. The debate may be followed in the
documents, particularly Public Record Office [PRO] AIR
37 I 514; there are good summaries in Lord Tedder, With
Prejudice, Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The
Strategic Air Offensive against Gennany, 1939-1945,
Vol.III pp.10-42, and in all the other official histories:
L.F. Ellis, Victory in the West, Vol.I and Gordon A.
Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, Ch.VI. Also of considerable importance are Solly Zuckerman, From Apes to
Warlords, Chs.12 & 13 and E. Kingston-McCloughry,
The Direction of War, Ch.VIII. but the list is really
endless.
6. D. Ose, "Entscheidung im Westen, 1944" Deutsche
Verlags Anstalt, Stuttgart, 1982, p.112. This despite
the fact that Jodl had recommended as early as June
13th that the risks of a second landing on other fronts
should now be accepted- see Harrison, Cross-Channel
Attack, p.412 - Rommel refused to listen to Jodi's
advice. For a different version see Warlimont, Inside
Hitler's Headquarters, pp.429-430.
7. A list of troop-trains maybe found in the 15th appendix
of the Seventh Army's Quartermaster's War Diary. For
example the Combat Group of the 275th Infantry
Division was moved with 14 trains between the 7th and
8th June; there were 6 trains for the Combat Group of
the 265th Division. See T 312/1571.
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8. Movements and orders for movements may be found in
the War Diary of the Seventh Army, T 312/1568. See
especially entry for 7 June which includes the report of
the arrival at the Army boundary of the forward units of
the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division.
9. Panzer Operations 6th-8th June, Panzer Lehr & 12th
SS, Bayerlin and Kramer Ms B 814, [NAC]
10. Meyer, H. "Kriegsgeschichteder 12 S.S. Panzerdivision"
Vol I- pp.72-85: Osnabruck 1982: The war diaries of
the Canadian division confirms this first, famous and
bloody encounter between these two divisions.
11. Special Interrogation Report [SIR], Lt. -Gen. W. Pickert,
Commander of the III Flak Corps. p.2 "In a rapid and
highly successful move, the three regiments north of
Paris succeeded in reaching the Caen sector by road by
8th June" [NAC].
12. Tagemeldung [Sitrep] June 7th and the War Diary of the
Seventh Army both mention the arrival of Panzer Lehr.
The Sitrep says that the Division was slow in arriving
because of Allied air power. War Diary for the 7th Army
also claims slow downs in the assembly areas. Neither
make any mention of specific losses.
13. SIR, Gen. H.F. von Luttwitz, Commander 2nd Panzer
Division and XXXXVII Panzer Corps, p.2 "Since the
bridges on the Seine north of Paris had been destroyed,
it was necessary to make the trip from Abbeville to
Bayeux via the French capital, a distance of 400 km. [it
is a distance of 250 km as the crow flies - (author's
insertion)]. Once the Seine had been crossed, the
motorized infantry were to make their way on foot or on
vehicle to Normandy while the tanks were to continue
by rail. The infantry arrived at Caumont on the 12th
June as scheduled, but the tanks were not so lucky.
Three locomotives had been shot up by the RAF and the
tanks had been forced to take the road. Making their
way chiefly by night, they were continuously strafed by
Allied planes, while new motors bumed themselves out
during the trip. Finally on the 18th June, six days after
the infantry had arrived, 80 of Luttwitz's tanks limped
into Caumont, while another 20 managed to arrive a
short time later." The SIR does not say how many were
lost permanently or when the others arrived. The "inst"
position of the 2nd Panzer Division before D-Day was 97
Mark IV and 67 Mark V tanks. [NAC]
14. This engagement hardly needs a footnote- its account
can be found in the Divisional histories and the general
accounts of the campaign.
15. SIR, Gen. Badinski, Commander of the 276 Infantry
Division: Section 3: The Move to Normandy, Ms B-526.
This Division, which arrived at the end of the month
from Bordeaux, required 45 trains. [See T312/l571].
The Commander of the 272nd Infantry Division, also
stationed in south em France, reported that "He thought,
however, that the Division had arrived according to
plan, and he did not think that they had suffered very
many casualties on the way up." See SIR F.A. Schack,
both documents at NAC.
16. SIR, Wisch, the Commander of 1st SS Panzer Division,
p.2 'The tanks came down by train and were detrained
somewhere in the neighbourhood of Paris. The infantry
for the greater part came by road. In any event the trip
had been uneventful and they suffered no great losses
from our air attacks", NAC.

17. See Max Hastings. Das Reich, (London, 1981), for the
details of the move of the 2nd SS Panzer Division.
18. Ralph Bennett, Ultra in the West, (London, 1979) esp.
pp. 79-83 for details.
19. SIR, Gen. Dienst!, Commander of 346th Infantry Division, p.2 "At 11.00 hours on 6th June, the Division was
ordered to cross the Seine at Caudebec, L 9426 on
ferries and to take up a position on the left flank of the
71lth Infantry Division which was holding the coastline from the Ome to the Seine. On arrival the Division's
task was to throw back the bridgehead of the 6th
Airbome Division to the west bank of the Ome. The
Division had little transport for this move and only 4-6
ferries were available for the Seine crossings. 867 GR
moved out first, with one battalion gaily making the 60
km. joumey on bicycles. It was two days before the
complete formation was committed and by then the
allied forces had become too strongly entrenched to be
budged."
'The chief deterrent to a successful counter-attack at
this time was the effectiveness of our artillery ... " NAC.
20. Ose, op. cit. p.ll6, Neither Eugen Kreidler, "Die
Eisenbahnen im Machtreich der Achsenmaechte
waehrend des Zweiten Weltkrieges" Frankfort, 1975
nor
Horst
Rohde,
"Das
Deutsche
Wehrmachttransportwesen im Zweiten Weltkrieg"
Deutsche Verlags Anstalt, Stuttgart, 1971 give very
much space to the problems of the Normandy battle.
Both are detailed accounts of many aspects of the
general problems but have few details on that particular aspect. Kreidler has only some rather general
comments on pages 67-72 about the problem of the
French railway network and the supply position. It is
very useful with regard to the organization of the
German controlled railways.
21. The supply problem of the German Seventh Army are
detailed in the War Diary of the Quartermaster Section.
It contains a great dealt of detail on virtually every
conceivable aspect of the Seventh Army Logistical problems. For example Appendix 8 deals with the length of
time it took for mail to get through to the troops from as
far away as Koenigsberg and gives the number of trains
that carried it. Appendix 8, The Quartermaster War
Diary of Seventh Army to 30 June may be found in
Freiburg Military archives - RH 20-7/295.

Robert Vogel, Professor of History at McGill
University and co-author of the Maple Leaf
Route series, died on April 1st, 1994. He
will be sorely missed by CMH and its
readers.
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